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Carbon Leakage with International Technology Spillovers 
Summary 
In this paper we study the effect of international technology spillovers on carbon 
leakage. We first develop and analyse two simple competing models for carbon leakage. 
The first model represents the pollution haven hypothesis. It focuses on the international 
competition between firms that produce energy-intensive goods. The second model 
highlights the role of a globally integrated carbon-energy market. We calculate formulas 
for the leakage rates in both models and, through meta-analysis, show that the second 
model captures best the major mechanisms reported in the CGE literature on carbon 
leakage. We extend this model with endogenous energy-saving technology and 
international technology spillovers. This feature is shown to decrease carbon leakage. 
We build-in the endogenous energy-saving technology in a large CGE model and verify 
that the results from the formal model carry over. Carbon leakage becomes negative for 
moderate levels of international technology spillover. 
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CARBON LEAKAGE WITH INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY SPILLOVERS 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Cutting the emissions of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide (CO2) has become a major political 
challenge for the coming decades. The political feasibility of the enterprise is hampered by global 
disagreement on the preferred level of abatement and its distribution over countries. Because of 
the close connection between CO2 emissions and fossil fuel use, countries that want to pursue a 
more restrictive policy with respect to their emissions worry that their energy-intensive industries 
will suffer from international competition from industries in countries that follow a laxer climate 
change policy. Abating countries will see their reduction efforts be offset to some extent by 
increasing emissions in non-abating countries, while income and employment leak away to those 
countries. Not only does this carbon-leakage phenomenon render emission reduction costly and 
ineffective, it also generates an extra incentive for free-riding behaviour, jeopardizing the scope 
for international climate agreements. It has been suggested that carbon leakage may require 
environmental policies to adjust from a generic approach with a carbon tax equal among sectors 
towards carbon taxes that are differentiated among sectors, sheltering those sectors that are 
threatened to loose most from international competition (Hoel 1996).  Carbon leakage has thus 
significant political weight and many computable general equilibrium (CGE) models have been 
used to determine its size and its relationship with key economic parameters. [  4,   6,   7,   8,   17,   28].
2 
  Felder and Rutherford [  17] develop a recursively dynamic CGE and conclude that the 
integration of the world market of fossil fuels is most important in explaining carbon leakage. In 
their model, a reduction in fossil fuel demand in abating countries leads to lower prices on the 
world energy market, which subsequently leads to an increase in energy demand in non-abating 
countries. Along the same line of argument, Burnieaux and Oliveira Martins [  8] conclude that, 
for integrated markets, carbon leakage is decreasing in the world elasticity of supply. An inelastic 
supply by definition means that quantities of supply will not adjust; all adjustment goes through 
prices. Consequently, a reduction in fossil fuel demand in abating countries must be exactly 
offset by an equal increase in other countries. Bohringer et al. [  6], Bollen et al [  7], and Paltsev 
[  27] emphasize a different transmission channel for carbon leakage. They show that carbon 
leakage is increasing with the intensity of international competition in energy-intensive goods. 
Strong international competition implies that increased energy costs in abating countries lead to 
an increased price for energy-intensive goods, and the stronger the international competition for 
these goods, the more production will move to countries with lower energy costs. This 
                                                 
2 In this paper, we abstract from endogenous environmental policy as in Golombek and Hoel [  18] and Copeland and 
Taylor (  13). In line with the typical CGE analyses, in our analysis we take environmental policies as an exogenous 
parameter.  
   3
mechanism is known as the pollution haven hypothesis. Within this spectrum of competing 
transmission channels, Babiker [  4] calculates the consequences of an extreme position when one 
assumes perfect substitution between energy-intensive goods produced in different countries, as 
in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. In this case, the international relocation of production of energy-
intensive goods is almost complete, and when the non-abating countries are less energy efficient 
than the abating countries, carbon leakage may even exceed 100%. 
  In this paper, we build on this literature and extend it with a formal analysis on technology 
spillovers. We foresee that a major stream in the coming CGE literature will be directed to the 
incorporation of new features in CGE models such as strategic behaviour, imperfect markets, and 
technological change. In applied analysis, the question is how these new features affect the 
quantitative results. We focus on technological change, specifically on the role of an 
internationally shared technology base, that is, international technology spillovers, and its effect 
on carbon leakage. The central idea throughout our analysis is that abatement policies may 
change the direction of technological change, not only domestically, but also internationally. 
There are many arguments for a substantial international R&D spillover [  11]. There is empirical 
evidence for the international spillover of technological change, the diffusion of environmental 
technologies [  23], and specifically for energy-saving innovations [  14,   28]. Based on this line of 
reasoning, some authors go so far as to assume that carbon leakage will be negative [  20]. We may 
consider our analysis as an assessment of technology conditions under which this optimistic 
assumption may hold. 
  Our approach is as follows. First, in Section   2 we develop two stylized models that each 
describes a particular transmission channel for carbon leakage. Grossman and Krueger [  19] 
present a helpful decomposition of emissions reductions that can also be used for decomposing 
carbon leakage, where changes in emissions are attributed to changes in the overall economic 
scale, the sectoral composition of the economy, and the production technology employed (see 
Kuik and Gerlagh [  22] for such a decomposition of carbon leakage). For CO2 emission reductions 
policies, the scale effects of climate change policy are typically negligible compared to the other 
two effects. We can therefore limit our analysis to the relative importance of the composition 
effect versus the technique effect. For carbon leakage the composition effect follows from the 
pollution haven hypothesis. When there is strong competition in the world market for energy-
intensive goods, carbon-energy intensive industries will move from CO2-abating countries to 
non-abating countries, and high carbon leakage results. Our first model, labelled the “pollution 
haven model”, describes this phenomenon. 
  That part of carbon leakage that can be attributed to the technique effect is not caused by 
international trade in energy-intensive goods, but by international trade in energy commodities. 
When, in abating countries, firms substitute other inputs for carbon-energy, global carbon-energy 
demand decreases. Assuming an integrated global carbon-energy market (and a less than fully 
elastic global of supply of carbon-energy), global carbon-energy prices fall. In turn, energy 
demand in the non-abating countries will increase as in these countries carbon-energy substitutes   4
for other inputs. We simply label this model the “energy market model”.  For  both  stylized 
models we assess the dependence of carbon leakage on their parameters, and in Section   3 we test 
both models by comparing the parameter dependence in the formal model with the results from a 
meta-analysis based on the CGE carbon-leakage literature. We specifically consider parameters 
describing the international competition in energy-intensive goods, and the global supply 
elasticity of carbon-energy. We extend the meta-analysis to a controlled experiment where we 
create a sample of simulations employing the GTAP-E model [  10]. The meta-analysis is used to 
select a preferred formal model for further analysis. 
  In Section   4 we further develop the formal model to include endogenous technological 
change and international technology spillovers. Our stylized description of technological change 
resembles Nordhaus’s [  26] and Sue Wing’s [  30] approach. Both describe a substitution frontier 
between carbon-energy and other inputs as possibly arising from two different mechanisms, 
either through a regular input-substitution frontier, or alternatively, through a technology variable 
that varies with prices and production choices. 
  Section   5 illustrates the formal analysis through an experiment with the CGE model GTAP-
E. Whereas the brief formal model has the advantage of analytical rigor and independence of 
data, the large-scale CGE model better describes the many feed backs in an integrated economy. 
Together, the evidence developed in this paper offers a rich picture of the scope for technological 
change and its international spillover to affect carbon leakage. We conclude in Section   6. 
 
2.  TWO MODELS FOR EXPLAINING CARBON LEAKAGE 
 
In this section we set up two models that represent two different transmission channels for carbon 
leakage: the pollution haven model and the energy market model. The pollution haven model 
developed here may be considered a stylized form of the model used in Di Maria and Smulders 
[  15] and Di Maria and van der Werf [  16]. Consider two countries, denoted by subscript i=A,B. 
The two countries are identical in structure; they are only different in size and CO2 reduction 
policy. Let θ denote the share of country A in the world economy, and let country A implement a 
carbon-energy tax to reduce carbon-energy use, while country B implements no CO2 reduction 
policy. To maintain the model structure as simple as possible, we only describe firms operating in 
the energy-intensive sector, which is assumed competitive so that firms are price takers. We 
describe output for this sector, carbon-energy use, and trade, and take prices of labour and other 
production factors as constant.  
  Under price-taking behaviour, a joint perfect substitution in the international markets for 
carbon-energy and for energy-intensive goods would lead to extreme equilibrium responses 
following a policy change in country A . Any carbon-tax in country A  would increase the 
production costs in country A and all production would move to country B. To prevent such 
extreme responses, we either assume an integrated market with perfect substitution for the 
energy-intensive output good, or for the carbon-energy input good, but not jointly.   5
  In the pollution haven model, we assume perfect substitution in the international markets for 
energy-intensive goods. There is one world market price for energy-intensive goods, q. World 
output Y is equal to world demand, and demand depends on the price through the elasticity of 
demand ε: 
 
  θYA + (1–θ)YB = –εq, (1) 
 
where all variables are in log-differences, so that Yi is the relative change in output in country i, 
and  q is the relative change in the energy-intensive goods price. We assume competitive 
producers implying that output prices change proportionally to input prices and taxes, multiplied 
by weights for input shares. All other production factor prices are assumed constant, so that 
output prices only depend on carbon-energy prices, plus a carbon-tax in country A. 
 
 q  = α(pA+τA) ,  (2) 
 q  = α pB, (3) 
 
where α is the share of carbon-energy in value added, pi is the relative price change of carbon-
energy in country i, and τA is the carbon-energy tax. Competitive production implies that carbon-
energy demand Ei is proportional to output and proportional to the price difference between 
output and input prices 
 
 E A = YA + μ(q–pA–τA), (4) 
 E B = YB + μ(q–pB) ,  (5) 
 
where μ is the elasticity of substitution between carbon-energy and other production factors. 
Finally, the model is closed by the carbon-energy supply functions, 
 
 E A = ψpA,   (6) 
 E B = ψpB, (7) 
 
where ψ is the elasticity of supply. We have 7 equations that determine the 7 variables, YA, YB, q, 
pA, pB, EA, EB as a function of τA. Since all equations are linear in all variables, all variables are all 
proportional to τA. We now define the carbon leakage rate as the increase in absolute emissions in 
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We state the dependence of the leakage rate on the parameters as a proposition: 
 
PROPOSITION 1. In the pollution haven model (1)-(7), carbon leakage is decreasing with the size 
of the country abating, θ, and zero for θ=1. The leakage rate is increasing in the elasticity of 
carbon-energy supply, ψ, zero for inelastic carbon-energy supply, ψ=0, and 100% for fully 
elastic carbon-energy supply, ψ=∞. Carbon leakage is decreasing in the elasticity of demand 
for energy-intensive goods, ε, and in the elasticity of substitution between carbon-energy and 
other inputs, μ. 
 
Formally, the proposition follows directly from (9). The intuition needs some explanation. The 
dependence of the carbon leakage on the size of country A ,  ∂LR/∂θ<0, is obvious.  When 
country A would comprise the world, θ=1, then by definition there can be no carbon leakage. In a 
continuous setting, it is then clear that the carbon leakage rate will decrease with the size of the 
country. For the other parameters, the dependence of the carbon leakage on the parameters is not 
obvious but dependent on the underlying model. We therefore first describe and analyze the 
second model, and only then discuss jointly for both models the intuition for the relation between 
parameters and carbon leakage. 
  The second model we develop assumes a fully integrated carbon-energy market characterized 
by one global carbon-energy price. In terms of the model, this means that equations (6) and (7) 
are replaced by (12). In return, we need to loosen the assumed perfect competition on the 
international market for energy-intensive goods, and instead, consider two separate markets; 
equation (1) is replaced by (13) and (14). All other equations remain the same, though country-
specific carbon-energy prices pi are replaced by one world carbon-energy price p, and the single 
world output price q is differentiated for both countries into qi.  
 
 E A = YA + μ(qA–pA–τA) (10) 
 E B = YB + μ(qB–pB)   (11) 
  θEEA + (1–θE)EB = ψp (12) 
  A = –εqA (13) 
  B = –εqB (14) 
  A = αA (p+τA)   (15) 
                                                 
3 We have used Mathematica software to solve formally for the leakage rates. The Mathematica code is available 
from the corresponding author upon request.   7
  B = αB p (16) 
 
For the energy market model, we can calculate the leakage rate (8) as 
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PROPOSITION 2. In the energy market model (10)-(16), the carbon leakage is decreasing with the 
size of the country abating, θ, and zero for θ=1. The leakage rate is decreasing in the 
elasticity of carbon-energy supply, ψ, 100% for inelastic carbon-energy supply, ψ=0, zero for 
fully elastic carbon-energy supply, ψ=∞, increasing in the elasticity of demand for energy-
intensive goods, ε, and in the elasticity of substitution between carbon-energy and other 
inputs, μ. 
 
Noticeably, in the energy market model, for all parameters but θ, dependence of the carbon 
leakage rate on the parameters has changed sign. This makes the two models well suited for 
testing in the next section. We can find out which of the two stylized models best reflects the 
mechanisms at play in typical CGE models used for the calculation of carbon leakage. This is the 
subject of the next section. First, we will describe the different mechanisms in the two models. 
Since in both models, only parameter ψ can move the carbon leakage rate over its entire range 
[0,1], this parameter is the most promising for comparing the two models. 
  The more elastic is the elasticity of carbon-energy supply, ψ, the more responsive is the 
carbon-energy supply to its price. In the pollution haven model, the two countries are linked 
through the market for energy-intensive goods, while the carbon-energy market is domestic. 
Thus, the higher the supply elasticity, the higher the potential for a carbon supply and use 
response in country B, thus ∂LR/∂ψ>0. When carbon-energy supply is fully elastic, ψ=∞, then 
carbon-energy prices in country B will be constant, pB=0 (7), global output prices q will be 
constant, q=0 (3), there will be no change in overall demand, θYA+(1–θ)YB (1), and no input 
substitution in country B (5). Thus, any decrease in carbon-energy in country A is exactly offset 
by a proportional decrease in its share in output, an increase in output in country B , and a 
proportional increase in carbon-energy inputs in country B. 
  In the energy market model, the two countries are linked through the energy market, and the 
effect of the global carbon-energy supply elasticity on carbon leakage is more direct. When 
country A reduces carbon-energy consumption, the change can be accommodated either through 
in increase in demand in country B (leakage) or a decrease in supply (no leakage). The higher the 
elasticity of supply, the stronger the adjustment of supply, the lower is the leakage, ∂LR/∂ψ<0. 
  In the pollution haven model, carbon leakage depends negatively on the elasticity of demand, 
∂LR/∂ε<0. When country A reduces carbon-energy consumption, the higher the elasticity of   8
demand, the higher is that part of the decrease in carbon-energy that can be accommodated 
through a decrease in overall demand of energy-intensive goods. In contrast, in the energy market 
model, the higher the elasticity of demand, the stronger the response of the consumers in country 
B and carbon-energy demand in country B thus compensates for a larger part of the decrease in 
demand in country A, ∂LR/∂ε>0.  
  Similarly, in the pollution haven model, a higher elasticity of substitution between carbon-
energy and other inputs accommodates alternative ways of reducing carbon-energy use  by 
shifting it to country B, hence ∂LR/∂μ<0. In the  energy market model, however, the higher the 
elasticity of substitution, the stronger the response of the firms in country B and carbon-energy 
demand in country B thus compensates for a larger part the decrease in demand in country A, 
∂LR/∂μ>0.  
 
3.  CARBON LEAKAGE IN CGE MODELS 
 
CGE estimates of the size of carbon leakage vary considerably. Table 1 lists a number of studies. 
The first column entry presents estimates of the leakage rate (LR); they range between 2 percent 
in OECD’s GREEN model to 21 percent in a model by Light et al. (1999) and even 115 percent 
in a specific simulation by the MIT-EPPA model. This section investigates the relation between 
the carbon leakage rates and the model parameters, listed in the other columns. 
  First, Table 1 reports the models’ assumptions on the share of global emissions of abating 
countries (θ) in 2010, and the assumed policy regime (P) which is 1 in the case of international 
emissions trading among abating countries and 0 otherwise. Second, the supply elasticities of 
fossil fuels indicate the rate of decreasing returns in their production. There is some disagreement 
among the models with respect to the relative elasticity of coal and oil versus gas. While GREEN 
and MIT-EPPA assume an elastic supply response for coal and a less elastic supply for gas, 
WorldScan assumes the reverse. We have calculated an avarage supply elasticity of carbon-
energy (ψ) as the output-and-carbon-intensity-weighted average of the models’ supply elasticities 
of coal, crude oil and gas. Third, we list the elasticity of substitution between imported and 
domestically produced energy commodities, νe, and imported and domestically produced energy-
intensive goods, νy. In case models assumed different trade substitution elasticities for different 
energy goods, we have calculated the average trade elasticity for the carbon-energy good as the 
trade-and-carbon-intensity-weighted average of the trade elasticities of coal, crude oil, and gas. 
   Finally, Table 1 reports the models’ substitution elasticity between energy and other factors 
of production (μ) and the substitution elasticity between energy-intensive goods and other goods 
in consumption (ε).   
    9
TABLE 1. Key results and elasticities in CGE literature
4 
Model and paper  LR  P  θ  ψ  νe  νy  μ  ε 
DEEP (Kallbekken, 2006)  0.06  1  0.35  1  4  4  0.5  1 
G-Cubed (McKibbin et al., 1999)  0.06  0  0.52  1  1  1  0.5  1 
GEM-E3 (Bernard and Vielle, 2000)  0.13  0  0.52  1  6  3  0.3  1 
GEM-E3 (Bernard and Vielle, 2000)  0.04  1  0.62  1  6  3  0.3  1 
GREEN (Burniaux et al., 2000)  0.05  0  0.52  8  4  4  0.4  n.a. 
GREEN (Burniaux et al., 2000)  0.02  1  0.62  8  4  4  0.4  n.a. 
GTAP-E (Burniaux and Truong, 2002)  0.04  0  0.52  5  19  2  0.5  0.8 
GTAP-E (Burniaux and Truong, 2002)  0.04  1  0.61  5  19  2  0.5  0.8 
GTAP-E (Kuik and Gerlagh, 2003)  0.16  0  0.52  1  7  2  0.5  0.8 
GTAP-E (Gerlagh and Kuik, this paper)  0.14  1  0.62  0.6  5  2  0.5  0.8 
GTAP-EG (Paltsev, 2001)  0.11  0  0.52  1  4  4  0.5  1 
Light (Light et al., 1999)  0.21  0  0.52  0.5  4  4  1  1 
MIT-EPPA (Babiker and Jacoby, 1999)  0.06  0  0.52  2.9  3  3  0.5  n.a. 
MIT-EPPA (Babiker, 2005)  0.20  1  0.51  0.8  8  8  0.5  n.a. 
MIT-EPPA, Babiker, 2005)  1.15  1  0.51  0.8  ∞ 8  0.3  n.a. 
MS-MRT (Bernstein et al., 1999)  0.19  0  0.52  1.5  4  4  0.3  1 
MS-MRT (Bernstein et al., 1999  0.16  1  0.61  1.5  4  4  0.5  1 
WorldScan (Bollen, 2004)  0.17  0  0.26  3  10  3  1  n.a. 
n.a. is not available, meaning that we could not find the elasticity in the model descriptions. 
 
Based on the sample, we try to explain the leakage rate on basis of the parameter choices. That is, 
we estimate 
 
 LRi = a0 + a1P + a2θ + a3ψ + a2νe  + a2νy  + a2μ + e,   (18) 
 
                                                 
4 LR = Rate of carbon leakage, P = Policy regime (1 if international emissions trading; 0 otherwise), θ = Global CO2 
emissions share of abating countries, ψ = Elasticity of supply of carbon-energy, νe = Armington trade elasticity of 
energy goods, νy  = Armington trade elasticity of energy-intensive goods, μ  =  Elasticity of substitution between 
carbon-energy and other inputs, ε = Elasticity of substitution between energy-intensive and other consumption goods.
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where  e is the error term, assumed white noise. We use OLS to estimate the parameters’ 
contribution, and leave out the outlier Babiker (2005) study with leakage rate above 100%. This 
produces a sample of 17 observations. Results are listed in Table 2. The sample is small and 
insufficient to determine the coefficients for all parameters at a significant level. Also, we did not 
have values for ε, the elasticity of substitution between energy-intensive and other consumption 
goods, for all simulations. Omitting all parameters with insignificant coefficient from the 
regression, we end with two parameters, explaining 42% of the variation in leakage rates. For 
comparison, in the first two columns of Table 2 we added the signs of the coefficients of the 
supply elasticity of carbon-energy, ψ, that are predicted by the pollution haven model and the 
energy market model, respectively (see Propositions 1 and 2). Over the CGE sample, we find 
carbon leakage to be negatively related to ψ, and positive related to  νy, (regression (1)). As the 
first two column entries of the table show, this finding is inconsistent with the pollution haven 
model, but consistent with the energy market model. 
  Since our sample contains more observations than models, we can extend the analysis with 
fixed effects coefficients. That is, we add independent dummy variables for each model, and the 
coefficients for these dummies capture the model-specific features that affect carbon leakage, 
independently of the parameters included in the analysis. Results are shown in regression (2). 
Using fixed effects implies that we have to drop all single model observations, leaving us with a 
sample size of 13. In this reduced sample, only the coefficient for the elasticity of carbon-energy 
supply remains significant. The result again supports the global energy market as the major 
transmission channel for carbon leakage, and it does not support the pollution haven hypothesis. 
Therefore, we conclude that the energy market model offers a better description of carbon 
leakage in CGE models than the pollution haven model.  
    11
TABLE 2. Dependence of carbon leakage (LR) on elasticities in CGE models
5 




(1) (2)  (3) 
ψ  +  –  –1.5*** –2.8** –10.6*** 
νy     1.6*   0.5*** 
νe         0.3*** 
νo        0.1*** 
μ –  +     8.1*** 
N     17 13  100 
Fixed effects      No Yes n.a. 
Degrees of freedom      14 7  94 
R
2
adj     0.42 0.77 0.98 
OLS; significance at p=0.05 marked with **, p=0.01 with ***. 
 
As a final check, we set up a controlled experiment with GTAP-E. We ran the model 100 times, 
varying the major parameters around their central value, plus-minus half their value, 
independently. This produced a database of 100 observations, which enabled us to check the 
results of the literature meta-analysis, as reported in column entry (3). Of those parameters 
varied, only the parameter ε was found insignificant, and left out of the table. 
 
4.  INPUT-SAVING TECHNOLOGY 
 
We now proceed with the formal analysis of the energy market model (10)-(16), extending the 
model with endogenous technological change. In the base model, the parameter μ describes the 
elasticity of substitution between carbon-energy and other inputs in production. Now, these 
substitution possibilities may arise because of substitution between factors for given technology, 
but they may also relate to switching between technologies, or development of new technologies 
dependent on factor prices. The role of technology in substitution in such models is extensively 
described in Nordhaus (2002) and Sue Wing (2006). In formal terms, let us denote by σ the 
elasticity of substitution including technological change, and let μ be that part of the substitution 
opportunities that are not due to technological change. Let the parameter γ denote the share of 
substitution possibilities due to technological change, so that μ=(1–γ)σ. We can think of μ as 
describing the substitution between carbon-energy intensive and extensive firms within the 
                                                 
5 See footnote 4 for description of parameters. νo = Armington trade elasticity of other goods, that is, non-energy and 
non-energy-intensive goods.   12
sector, using energy-saving equipment that is available for the benchmark technology. Figure 1 
illustrates the concept. 
  In Figure 1, the iso-output curve I depicts all input pairs (X1,X2) with constant output, for 
given technology. At the reference case, the input mix is at point A. When the second input 
factor, say carbon-energy, becomes more expensive, non-carbon energy factors will substitute, 
and input will move along curve I. Technology will also adjust and will become more carbon-
energy saving, shifting the iso-output curve I to curve II. Curve III captures both direct and 
technology-induced factor substitution. The input mix will move along this curve to point B. In 
terms of our model, σ describes the inverse curvature of curve III, while μ describes the inverse 
curvature of curves I and II. The parameter γ describes the contribution of moving from curve I to 
curve II, relative to moving along curve I or curve II. The same idea is – in a dynamic context – 






















Technology shift: σ–μ 
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X1 (non-carbon energy inputs) 
 
FIGURE 1. Graphical illustration of technology-driven and non-technology substitution 
 
We now specify this mechanism within our stylized model. We start with a standard description 
of curve III as a CES production function. Let output Y depend in inputs Xi, and technology 
vector ζ, with elasticity of substitution σ: 










   (19) 
 
Now, we introduce an endogenous technology vector A in the production function, and we 
assume that for given technology A, the elasticity of substitution is reduced to (1–γ)σ: That is, for 
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respectively. Demanding consistency between the two price equations gives 
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This equation ensures that curves I and II indeed move along curve III. When we substitute Hi 
for  Ai
1–(1–γ)σ
, we can derive a set of relatively simple equations determining the level of 
technology Hi and demand Xi, for given prices (pi,q) and output Y: 
 









The second of the two equations shows that Hi  can be considered as pure input-saving 
technology, while the first equation presents the dependence of Hi to the input-mix and it shows 
that the elasticity of technological change with respect to the input change is γ.   14
  We insert this type of technological change in our energy market model (10)-(16), and 
assume full international technology spillovers, so that we can replace (10) and (11) by 
 
 E A = YA – H + μ(qA–p–τA) (26) 
 E B = YB – H + μ(qB–p) (27) 
 H  = γ[θ(YA–EA) + (1–θ)(YB–EB)] (28) 
 
The new equations say that energy demand is decreasing proportionally to energy-specific 
technology  H, while technology is increasing if the share of carbon-energy input decreases. 
Endogenous technology changes the carbon leakage rate from (17) into 
 
 LR = (a–b)/(a–b+c)=1–c/(a–b+c) (29) 
 
where for convenience of notation, we use a>0, b>0, and c>0 according to 
 
 a  = (1–θ)[αε+(1–α)μ][(1–γ)αε+(1–α)μ] (30) 
 b  = (1–θ)(1–α)γμψ (31) 
 c  = ψ[(1–γ)αε+(1–α)μ)] (32) 
 
The leakage rate formula has become more complex, but we can easily see that for γ=0, we have 
b=0 and the previous equation (17) is found.  
  The dependence of the leakage rate on technology spillover γ, is stated in the following 
proposition: 
 
PROPOSITION 3. In the energy market model with endogenous technological change (12)-(16), 
(26), (27), (28), we have that (i) carbon leakage is decreasing in the level of global 
endogenous technology, γ, and (ii) for all positive and finite parameters α, ε, μ, ψ, there exists 
a γ such that the leakage rate is negative.  
 
Proof. (i) From (31) we see that b is increasing and proportional in γ. From (30) and (32) we see 
that a and c are decreasing in γ, but they are proportional to (1–γ). Consequently, the numerator 
in the last term of equation (29) will be decreasing proportionally with (1–γ), while the 
denominator will be decreasing faster than proportional with (1–γ). Hence, the ratio will 
increase, and the leakage rate will fall. 
  (ii) It follows from (29), (30) and (31) that the carbon leakage rate is negative if 
 
  γ > (αε+(1–α)μ)
2/[(1–α)μψ], (33) 
 
which can be calculated as a finite number. Q.E.D.   15
 
The equation gives a simple formula for the required technology spillover to find negative carbon 
leakage [cf.   20]. For example, when carbon-energy has a value share in production α=0.1, when 
the elasticity of demand and elasticity of substitution are both set to conservative values ε=0.5, 
μ=0.5, and when the elasticity of supply is set to ψ=2, then the required technology share in 
substitution needs to be γ>0.28. When carbon-energy supply is very inelastic, however, e.g. 
ψ=0.1, then when we apply the same values for the other parameter, we would need a very high 
level of technology spillover, γ>5.56, far beyond the maximum level of 1. 
  The analysis so far is, however, conservative, as a symmetric technology spillover between 
abating and non-abating countries is improbable. Most probably high-income countries will abate 
more compared to low-income countries. Also, high-income countries tend to invest more in 
innovation, and technologies in developed countries are more often copied in developing 
countries than the other way around. The asymmetry in technology spillover would give extra 
support to the argument for decreasing carbon leakage [  5,   11,   29]. In our model, the asymmetry 
can be included through an adjustment of the technology equation (28) into 
 
 H  = γ(YA–EA) (34) 
 
Solving for the leakage rate under this specification, we find the same equation (17) but now with  
 
 b  = [(1–θ)/θ](1–α)γμψ (35) 
 c  = ψ((1–γ)αε+(1–α)(1+[(1–θ)/θ]γ)μ)) (36) 
 
It can easily be seen that both c is larger and a–b+c is smaller with one-sided spillovers compared 
to the situation with symmetric spillovers. Thus the leakage rate is smaller. We state this result as 
a proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 4. With one-sided technology spillovers from the abating country to the non-abating 
country, carbon leakage is less compared to the situation with symmetric spillovers.  
 
Proof. In text. 
 
5.  INCLUDING CARBON-ENERGY SAVING TECHNOLOGY IN GTAP-E 
 
To test the analytical model developed in Section 4 against real data, we inserted endogenous 
carbon-energy saving technology in GTAP-E, an existing multi-region, multi-sector CGE model 
of international trade and carbon emissions [  10]. We used the GTAP-E model before to simulate 
carbon leakage in the context of the Kyoto Protocol [  22].   16
  GTAP-E has a nested CES production structure, with substitution possibilities between 
energy commodities and other commodities (capital, labor) on the one hand, and between 
different energy commodities on the other hand. In line with the theory developed in this paper, 
we have assumed that substitution between these commodities is partly due to technical change, 
and partly due to “classical” input substitution. In our representation, technical change can go in 
either direction. If a commodity is used more, the technology of its use improves and its unit cost 
decreases. If a commodity is used less, the reverse occurs. A price increase of carbon-energy 
induces input-saving technical change for carbon-energy, and input-augmenting technical change 
for other commodities. Technological change is modelled such that the overall effect of technical 
change on the costs of the final product is zero. In other words, induced technical change does not 
affect overall productivity in a sector or economy; it just changes the direction of productivity. 
Including technological change, without international technology spillovers, and without 
changing the overall elasticity (for which we used the parameter σ in Section 4), has no effect on 
simulated scenarios.
6 This result serves as a check that induced technological change, in itself, 
has no effect on carbon leakage. Induced technological change only makes a difference with the 
standard GTAP-E model when technological change can spill over from one country to other 
countries to augment their production possibilities (see Annex I for a detailed discussion of the 
model adjustments). 
  To test the model, we used an 8x8 aggregation of GTAP’s version 6 database, augmented by 
Lee’s CO2 emissions data of November 2005. The eight regions in the model are the Annex I 
countries of Europe, Japan, Canada and New Zealand; USA and Australia; countries of the 
former Soviet Union; and five developing country or Non-Annex I regions (see Table 3). The 
eight commodities are coal, crude oil, gas, petroleum products, electricity, energy-intensive 
goods, other goods and services, and capital goods. We used projections of the Energy 
Information Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy (EIA/DOE, 2005) in its 
International Energy Outlook 2005 “Reference Scenario” (IEO2005RS) to update the database to 
2010. In order to approximately replicate the CO2 emissions projections of EIA/DOE we carried 
out a forward-calibration of the GTAP-E database with a rise in the world market oil price, 
increased Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per region, and decreased overall energy-intensity per 
region. In IEO2005RS the world market price of crude oil rises from about US$30 per barrel in 
2004 to more than US$40 in 2005 to decline gradually to US$31 in 2010. In the IEO2005RS 
scenario, world GDP rises by 43% in the period 2001-2010, energy-intensity decreases by 18%, 
and CO2 emissions increase by 25%. CO2 emissions rise faster in Non-Annex I countries (52%) 
than in Annex I countries (12%), so that the share of Non-Annex I countries’ CO2 emissions 
increases from 39% in 2001 to 47% in 2010. Table 3 shows that our CO2 emissions projections 
are fairly close to those of IEO2005RS.   
                                                 
6 In the formal model of Section 4, if technological change is country specific, so that H is split in HA and HB, and 
(34) is specified for both countries, then the leakage rate is given by (17), where σ should substitute for μ.   17
 
TABLE 3. CO2 emissions projections for the period 2001-2010 (% increase)  
  IEO2005RS GTAP-E adjusted data 
Annex I  12  12 
Non-Annex I  47  52 
World 25  26 
Europe, Japan, Canada, and New Zealand 5  7 
USA and Australia   16  16 
Former Soviet Union  17  12 
Energy-exporting developing countries  31  35 
China and India  65  75 
Dynamic East-Asian countries  27  28 
Dynamic Latin-American countries  26  20 
Rest of the world  35  36 
         
We constructed two policy scenarios. In the first scenario, KYO1, both the Annex I countries and the USA 
and Australia comply with their Kyoto targets and reduce CO2 emissions by 13, respectively 30 percent 
below baseline in 2010. There is emissions trading between the two abating regions, so that the carbon 
permit price is equal for both regions. The countries of the former Soviet Union do not abate emissions, 
nor do they sell surplus emissions permits (“hot air”) to other countries. In the second policy scenario, 
KYO2, the USA and Australia do not participate in the Kyoto agreement, and do not abate emissions. 
  In the standard solution of GTAP-E the rate of carbon leakage of participating Annex I countries to 
Non-Annex I countries is 13.8 percent in KYO1 and 16.8 percent in KYO2. The increase in leakage in 
KYO2 over KYO1 confirms the element of Proposition 2 that states that carbon leakage is decreasing with 
the size of the country abating.
7 If endogenous technical change and spillovers are included in the model, 
the rate of carbon leakage decreases in proportion to the relative strength of endogenous technical change 
(γ). In the figures below, the relationships between the relative strength of technical change (on the X-
axes) and the rates of carbon leakage (on the Y-axes), are shown for the two scenarios. The left panel 
shows the KYO1 scenario, whereas the right panel shows the KYO2 scenario. Within each scenario, we 
vary the rate of international technology spillover from 0 to 40%. We calculate the leakage rates both for 
symmetric technology spillovers between OECD and non-OECD countries, and for asymmetric spillovers 
when technology only spills over from OECD countries to non-OECD, but not the other way round. 
  The figures below show that the rate of carbon leakage becomes negative for levels of γ between 0.2 
and 0.3. That is, if 20 to 30 percent of the CGE-predicted input-substitution that is induced by CO2 
reduction policy would be due to input-saving technical change and if this technical knowledge would 
                                                 
7   θKYO1 = 0.52 > θKYO2 = 0.26, hence LRKYO1 = 13.8 <  LRKYO2 = 16.8   18
freely spill over between countries, than carbon leakage could become zero or even negative. Figure 2 
shows that carbon leakage is most reduced by a one-sided spillover, confirming Proposition 4, but the fact 
that there is technology spillover is more important than its direction (from OECD to non-OECD or two-
sided). Assuming a smaller abating region as in KYO2 (in the right panel of Figure 2) shifts the curves up, 
but when technology spillover becomes a substantial effect, the size of the abating country seems to 
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FIGURE 2. Carbon leakage and international technology spillovers 
 
We also looked into the distribution of carbon leakage over the Non-Annex I regions and found 
that the position of China-India is remarkable. In the standard solution, about 50 percent of total 
leakage is related to the increase in emissions in this region. But at the same time, emissions in 
China-India are more-than-average sensitive to technology spillovers, and the turning-point at 
which the change in emissions becomes negative in China-India is reached before the overall 
leakage rate becomes negative. The transfer of technology to China and India seems most 
important for achieving negative leakage rates. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
 
Our analysis suggests that, under standard assumptions of optimizing behavior of economic 
agents, technological spillovers can lead to small or even negative rates of carbon leakage. We 
developed a simple, formal model of carbon leakage, that was shown, through meta-analysis, to 
be qualitatively equivalent to the large-scale CGE models that have been used to compute 
leakage rates. We extended this simple model with endogenous energy-saving technical change 
and international spillovers. From this extended model, a reduced-form equation for the rate of 
carbon leakage was derived. This equation shows that carbon leakage decreased in the level of 
spilled-over endogenous technology and that the leakage rate can indeed become negative. 
Applying the theoretical insights of our formal model to a large-scale CGE model, we simulated 
carbon leakage under (variants of) the Kyoto Protocol. The results tentatively suggested that 
carbon leakage could become negative even under moderate levels of technological spillover.   19
While we consider our analysis an important step forward from earlier work on this issue, 
which either missed theoretical rigor or focused on the pollution haven model of carbon leakage, 
we do acknowledge that our analysis leaves room for further extensions. Obvious improvements 
would include a fully dynamic representation of energy-saving technical change supported by 
empirical evidence, and a detailed analysis of international technical spillover, taking into 
account all kinds of political, institutional, cultural and economic barriers. We do think, however, 
that our simple model can be useful in structuring this future research.                   
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APPENDIX 
In this Appendix, the adjustments to GTAP-E to simulate endogenous carbon-energy-saving 
technical change and international spillovers are briefly explained. The authors are happy to share 
the source code with anyone interested. The most important adjustments to the GTAP-E model 
are regarding the production functions of its industries. The production functions account for 
several substitution possibilities between energy commodities and other inputs, and between 
different types of energy commodities. A graphical illustration of GTAP-E’s nested production 
function is given in Figure 3.    20
Value added 
inputs
Output of sector j
Non-energy 
intermediate inputs
Labour Capital + Energy (KE)
Capital (K) Composite Energy (E)
Electricity Non-electricity
Other fuels Coal







CES: σ=ELKE; af = afetc2




FIGURE 3. A graphical illustration of GTAP-E’s nested production function (the afetc parameters 
are not part of GTAP-E’s original parameters; they are explained in the text below) . 
 
In GTAP-E’s nested production function, the composite capital-energy good, KE, in Level I, is a 
CES aggregate of capital, K, and energy, E, of Level II of the production function. All else being 
equal, if the relative price of energy increases, producers will substitute capital for energy in the 
production of the capital-energy good. The rate of substitution is given by GTAP-E’s exogenous 
elasticity of substitution: σ=ELKE. GTAP-E is written in log-linear form, so that its variables 
represent percentage changes. An industry’s conditional input demand is given by:  
 
  qE = – af  + qKE – ELKE * (pE – af – pKE)   (A1) 
   21
where q and p denote percentage changes in quanities and prices, respectively, and af is an 
exogenous technical change parameter, which has as an index both the country, the sector, and 
the input at the considered level of the CES tree. Equation (A1) says that the share of energy in 
the capital-energy composite good will diminish if i) the relative price of energy, pE, increases, 
ii) if energy-saving technological change occurs, or iii) if both occur. 
  We now make energy-saving technological change, af, endogenous by assuming that a 
fraction, γ, of the relative, price-induced change in demand for energy (qKE – qE) is due to 
technical change. We call this endogenous technical change parameter afetc. In GTAP-E, the 
technology adjustment is then given by: 
 
 afetc = γ/[1 – (1 – γ)ELKE] * (qKE – qE). (A2) 
 
By analogous reasoning, technical change for capital is 
 afetc = γ/[1 – (1 – γ)ELKE] * (qKE – qK). (A3) 
 
Notice that afetc has an index for the country, sector, and for capital vs. energy. With a price 
increase of energy, pE > 0, afetc for energy will be positive and afetc for capital will be negative. 
If one substitutes the afetc’s for the af’s in Equation (A1), one sees that a price increase of energy 
will reduce the conditional demand for energy through a substitution effect, – ELKE*(pE – pKE), 
as well as through induced energy-saving technological change (through the afetc’s). 
  Because of GTAP-E’s specific nesting structure and the fact that the technical change 
parameters are assigned to the individual commodities (capital (K), electricity (EL), coal (CO), 
and Oil, gas and petroleum (Fi)), and not the compositie commodities (capital-energy (KE), 
energy (EN), non-electricity (NEL), and non-coal (NCO)), care must be taken to avoid double-
counting if one wants to implement endogenous technical change in all levels of the production 
function. The level-specific afetc parameters for the individual commodities are presented in the 
following table: 
 




-1  (qKE – qK)        αELKE
-1   ( qKE – qEN + 
afetc2)                                    
αELKE
-1  (qKE – qEN 
+ afetc2)                          
αELKE




-1  (qEN – afetc2 – 
qEL)                                       
αELLY
-1   ( qEN –
qNEL+afetc3)                  
αELLY
-1  (qEN –qNEL+afetc3)    
Level IV: 
afetc4 
   αELCO
-1   ( qNEL –
afetc2 – afetc3 – qCO)     
αELCO
-1   ( qNEL – qNCO + 
afetc4)                                           
Level V:  
afetc5 
    αELFU
-1   ( qNCO –  afetc2 –
afetc3 – afetc4 – qFi )                   
N.B. α =  γ/[1 – (1 – γ)]   22
 
The technical change parameters afetc which have now become endogenous play a role in 
GTAP-E’s input price equations, which keep their original form. The (effective) price of the KE 
composite good is determined by the equation: 
 
 pKE  = θ (pK – afetc2) + (1 – θ) (pE – afetc2)   (A4) 
 
where θ is the original input cost share. It can be shown that θafetc2 + (1–θ)afetc2 = 0, so that 
endogenous technical change in our model does not affect the price of the composite KE 
commodity, nor the price of the end product. Endogenous technical change does only affect the 
input mix in the direction of more capital and less energy. Further down the production structure, 
a carbon tax will increase technical change in the less-carbon intensive energy commodities, and 
decrease technical change in the more-carbon intensive energy commodities.  
  Next we come to international technology spillovers. Let the indices r and s represent the 
domestic country and the foreign country respectively. We assume that the domestic country r 
abates CO2 emissions and that by doing so it increases its knowledge on low-CO2 technologies. 
In the case of one-sided international technology spillovers, this induced technical knowledge is 
frictionless transferred to foreign countries. Hence for country s: 
 
 afetc(s) =  Φafetc(r)   (A5) 
 
Where Φ = 1 if there is an international technology spillover and Φ = 0 if there is not.  
  In our model, however, endogenous technical change is not exclusive for the country abating 
emissions. Because of changes in relative world prices, country s can also experiences technical 
change – usually in the opposite direction from country r. To capture the two-sided international 
technology spillover (or multi-sided in case of more than two countries), the spillover parameter 
Φ is made a continuous, country-specific parameter on the domain (0,1) with Φ(r) + Φ(s) = 1. 
We let Φ(r) and Φ(s) be the shares in gross world product of countries r and s, reflecting the 
‘strengths’ of the technological knowledge spillovers from these countries. 
  Including the spillover parameter in the afetc equations, yields the endogenous input-saving 
technology paramater afetc in level # of the production function of sector j as a function of γ and 
σ, and of the GDP-weighted policy-induced conditional input demand changes, (qA – qB), in all 
countries s. In formula:    
 
 Afetc#(r) = γ/[1 – (1 – γ)σ] * Σ Φ(s) (qA – qB)   (A6) 
   23
Equation (A6) presents the general form in which the endogenous technical change parameters 
are implemented in GTAP-E.  
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